tisements at equilibrium is favoured by evolution.
23
This result helps to address a significant tension in the handicap principle it is the cost associated with deception that stabilises honesty, and that the 27 honest signals exhibited at equilibrium need not be extravagant at all.
28
The current model suggests that while extravagant and wasteful signals 29 are not required to ensure a signalling system's evolutionary stability, extrav-30 agant signalling systems may enjoy an advantage in terms of evolutionary
Introduction 36
Zahavi's handicap principle was proposed as a way of accounting for the 37 evolution of honest signalling by linking the stability of a signalling system to 38 the costs involved in signal production (Zahavi, 1975 (Zahavi, , 1977 . The handicap 39 principle asserts that a signalling system honestly advertising some property
40
(say the quality of a prospective mate, or the hunger of an offspring, or 41 the escape ability of a prey item) will be resistant to invasion by cheats if 42 signalling imposes fitness costs on signallers, and these costs allow signallers 43 with more of the advertised quality to distinguish themselves from those with 44 less by making larger signals (Grafen, 1990a) .
45
This principle was originally inspired by the observation that many natu-46 ral signals appear needlessly extravagant (Zahavi, 1975 (Zahavi, , 1977 . Peacocks, for 47 example, construct and maintain a tail that is a significant and, to the disin-48 terested observer, irrational drain on resources. Might the same information 49 not be conveyed through a stable signalling system employing much cheaper 50 signals? Similarly, would it not make more sense for stags, stoneflies, man-51 akins, and fireflies to employ discrete and efficient signals in preference to 52 the protracted, exhausting, and potentially dangerous bellowing, drumming, 53 dueting, and flashing that they actually engage in?
54
A series of game theoretic treatments have shown that signal cost can 55 confer evolutionary stability on handicap signalling systems (e.g., Enquist,
56
More generally, it is now understood that whether or not honesty will 82 persist over evolutionary time is determined by the net cost or net bene-83 fit associated with a move from honesty to dishonesty (the "marginal net 84 benefit" of honesty), rather than the raw cost of signals made at equilib- impose high gross fitness costs on signallers, but also includes those that 90 impose low costs, zero cost, or even benefits on signallers. Consequently,
91
handicap signalling need not be extravagant in the sense that observed sig-92 nals are expected to be of (excessively) large magnitude (e.g., Bullock, 1997;  93 Hasson, 1997; Getty, 1998; Bergstrom et al., 2002) . For a summary of this 
97
Here, an alternative account for the evolution of extravagance is consid-98 ered. Whereas previous game-theoretic models have tended to address the 99 evolutionary stability of honest communication on a single signalling chan-100 nel, here a model is developed in which the evolution of signalling systems 101 that are able to competitively exclude one another can be explored. The hy-102 pothesis to be examined is whether, when considering two signalling systems 103 that both have the potential to be stable and honest, the more extravagant 104 one (i.e, the signalling system employing advertisements of larger magnitude) 105 might enjoy a selective advantage. 
1 Note that, following Grafen (1990a) , receivers are rewarded only for the accuracy of their ability to estimate a signaller's quality, and that over-estimation is treated as equivalent to under-estimation. In reality, there may be situations where the impact of receiver accuracy on fitness varies with signaller quality, and where the fitness consequences of over-estimation differ from those of under-estimation.
Player S gains the benefit (rq B ) of receiving a response, r, from Player R,
127
but pays the cost (−aq C ) of producing an advert, a. In each case the fitness 128 contribution may be mediated by the signaller's own quality, q, depending
129
on the values taken by the parameters B and C.
Where B is positive the impact of receiver response, r, on signaller fitness 131 is greater for signallers with higher q. Where B is negative, this impact is 
140
An honest signalling system for this game is a separating equilibrium 141 where signallers produce a unique advertisement, a, for each unique value 142 of quality, q, being advertised, and receiver response r will equal signaller 143 quality q. At the game's non-signalling equilibrium signallers will produce 144 advertisements of zero magnitude for every value of quality being advertised,
145
and receivers will respond with a best guess at signaller quality.
146
In order to be stable, an honest signalling system must ensure that "better 147 signallers do better by advertising more" (Grafen, 1990a represents Zahavi's (1975; 1977) the cost of signal production is independent of signaller need, i.e., C = 0 (e.g.,
164
Godfray , 1991; Maynard Smith, 1991) . These models have concluded that,
165
in order for such signalling to be honest, the benefits to signallers of observer 166 behaviour must increase with need, i.e., B > 0 (cf. the heavy vertical arrow 167 in figure 1 ).
168
A complementary set of models addressing the signalling of quality have 169 assumed that the benefit to signallers of an observer response is indepen-170 dent of signaller quality, i.e., B = 0 (e.g., Hurd, 1995) . These models have 171 concluded that, in order for such signalling to be honest, the cost of signal 172 production must decrease with signaller quality, i.e., C < 0 (cf. the heavy 173 horizontal arrow in figure 1 ).
174
Finally, Grafen's (1990a) result can be represented by the cross-hatched the hungrier chick more to do so.
195
By contrast, consider the class of scenarios specified by B < C < 0
196
(represented by the unshaded hatched region in figure 1 a response strategy R α , R β that defines a mapping, a → r.
215
During each bout of signalling, S makes an advertisement with positive 216 magnitude a on the basis of q,
R completes the bout of signalling by making a response, r, on the basis
[ Figure where a signalling mapping is not flat, it may be truncated such that either 225 some low-or high-quality signallers make advertisements of zero magnitude.
226
At the conclusion of a bout, scores are allocated to R and S on the basis of 227 equations (1) and (2). from the receiver population with probability proportional to their score.
234
Offspring inherit the response strategy of their parent, subject to unbiased 235 mutation in which a perturbation on each strategy component is drawn from 236 the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.01.
237
A new generation of signallers is bred in a similar fashion. However,
238
since signaller scores may be negative, the probability with which parents 239 are selected from the signaller population is inversely proportional to the 240 rank of their score within the population, rather than proportional to the 241 raw score itself. Inherited signaller strategies are mutated in the manner described for response strategies, above.
243
The new generation of signallers and receivers are then paired, engage in 244 a bout of signalling and bred as before. The simulation is terminated after
245
G generations of this process (G = 5000 for all results reported here).
246
Note that, following Grafen (1990b), we model the co-evolution of sig- 
Here, S * i (q) is the magnitude of the advertisement generated by a signaller 259 of quality q using the equilibrium signaller strategy from signalling system i. as a proxy for honesty, and signal range, ρ, as a proxy for extravagance.
For a particular signalling strategy, the signal range was determined by 269 the signed difference between the magnitude of a when q = q max and the 270 magnitude of a when q = q min . For each simulated scenario,ρ was calculated
Here,S(q) is the magnitude of the advertisement generated by a signaller 273 of quality, q, employing the mean signaller strategy, S α ,S β . For all results
274
reported here q min = 1 and q max = 5.
275
For a particular pair of signaller and response strategies, receiver error 2 Note that (i) the space of signalling strategies used here guarantees that a will always be a monotonic function of q, and (ii) we expect that for any honest signalling system a ≈ 0 for signaller with quality q = q min . This allows us to use the difference between the magnitude of the advertisement given by the lowest and highest quality signallers as a proxy for extravagance. We could also have used the average advertisement magnitude, or calculated the extravagance using equation (6) without qualitatively changing the results reported here. However, the signal range metric employed here has an advantage in that its sign differentiates signallers whose advertisements increase with q from those whose advertisements decrease with q, or do not vary with q and are therefore uninformative.
Here, q j is drawn from a set of Q values evenly distributed between q min 280 and q max , andR(a) is the magnitude of the response to an advertisement of 281 magnitude a generated by the mean response strategy, R α ,R β .
282
Note that the stochasticity introduced by mutation ensures that an evolv-283 ing population will never reach a true equilibrium. We classify a simula- est quality signallers again evolve to produce advertisements of approx. zero 300 magnitude, and receivers are able to achieve low response error,ǭ < ǫ thresh .
301
The evolution of the associated strategy parameters is depicted in figure 4.
302
For B > C, S α and R α stabilise rapidly with the remaining two parameters Conversely, where B > C, honest signalling equilibria are always achieved: 316 signallers make honest advertisements such that higher quality signallers em-317 ploy larger advertisements (ρ > 0), and receivers are able to recover signaller 318 quality from these advertisements with low error (ǭ < ǫ thresh ). Where B = C 319 signalling behaviour repeatedly evolves but is not stable. In summary, simu-320 lated populations had no trouble reaching honest signalling equilibria when 321 these equilibria were predicted to exist, and at these equilibria honest sig- We extend the current model by including in the expression for signaller 341 fitness a second cost term associated with the additional signalling channel. 
In general, where both signalling channels are able to support stable hon- 
Two Channels: Simulation Results

362
Here, the original simulation has been augmented such that signallers now 363 inherit a strategy specifying two mappings, q → a 1 and q → a 2 . Likewise,
364
receivers now inherit a mapping for each signalling channel, a 1 → r and 365 a 2 → r, and, in addition, a switch, γ ∈ {1, 2}, that specifies to which channel 366 the receiver will exclusively attend. Since this switch element may take only two values, mutation via Gaussian perturbation is inappropriate. Rather,
368
during reproduction, a parental γ value is swapped for the alternative allele 369 with mutation probability, m (m = 0.05 for all results reported here).
370
Signallers are thus free to employ one, both or neither of the two signalling the first few generations and achieve low response error after 500 generations.
380
By contrast, on channel 2 (C = −1.5) advertising is rapidly extinguished, and 381 the (unused) receiver strategy (which is under very weak selection pressure)
382
is unable to produce a good estimate of signaller quality.
383
More generally, the model's parameters B, C 1 and C 2 now define a three-384 space over which we can explore signalling system evolution. In order to 
Competition Between Established Signalling Systems
400
[ Figure 11 about here.]
401
Here we simulate abrupt contact between two stable signalling systems
402
that have evolved to equilibrium in isolation. One more extravagant "invad-
403
ing" system for which C 1 = −2 encounters a less extravagant "incumbent"
404
system for which C 2 = −1 (the labels "invading" and "incumbent" are arbi-405 trary and could be reversed).
406
Initially we allow each system to evolve in isolation as per the rubric 407 of section 2. We fix B = 0, ensuring that, since B − C 1 > B − C 2 > 408 0, the equilibrium signalling behaviour in the invading population will be 409 more extravagant than that in the incumbent population, but both signalling 410 systems will be stable and honest.
411
We then create a new mixed population of N = 1000 signallers by select- 
419
By varying p we can determine that the more extravagant signalling sys-420 tem enjoys an advantage under these circumstances, being able to achieve by Zahavi (1975 Zahavi ( , 1977 , C < 0 (diagonal hatching), and the 578 handicap signalling regimes suggested by models due to Grafen Zahavi (1975 Zahavi ( , 1977 , C < 0 (diagonal hatching), and the handicap signalling regimes suggested by models due to Grafen (1990a): B ≥ 0 and C < 0 (cross-hatching); Godfray (1991) and Maynard Smith (1991): vertical arrow defined by B > 0 and C = 0; and Hurd (1995): horizontal arrow defined by B = 0 and C < 0). The current model predicts that honesty will be stable when B > C (grey shaded region) which is not consistent with Zahavi's original claim, but is consistent with the findings of the subsequent models represented here. solid curves) and conditions that do no (B = 0, C = +1; dashed curves). For signallers, a pair of curves indicate evolutionary change in the magnitude of advertisements (a) given by highest quality and lowest quality signallers employing the mean signaller strategy at each generation during two representative simulation runs. For receivers, each curve indicates evolutionary change in the receiver error (ǭ) produced by receivers employing the mean receiver strategy at each generation during the same two simulation runs. The dotted grey line atǭ = ǫ thresh indicates the threshold on receiver error that was used to distinguish the attainment of honest signalling from failure to do so. Parameters: G = 5000, N = 1000, q min = 1, q max = 5, ǫ thresh = 0.3, Q = 400. Figure 6: Data from the simulation runs depicted in figure 5 aggregated and re-plotted against B − C. The dashed curve shows the proportion of runs achieving an honest signalling equilibrium (i.e., for whichǭ < ǫ thresh ). The solid curve shows the average value ofρ normalised w.r.t. the maximum observedρ value (std. dev. values were small, varying between 1% and 3% of the mean). The inset plot re-plots the solid curve on a log scale. Ten evolved signaller mappings, q → a, separate into two bundles, one for scenarios where B − C = 1 (grey curves, a) and one for scenarios where B − C = 2 (solid curves, A). In each case, receiver strategies produce responses, r, that are near optimal (i.e., the dashed response curves lie close to the dotted line, q → r * ). The two sets of {B, C} scenarios depicted are {{−1, −2}, {0, −1}, {1, 0}, {2, 1}, {3, 2}} (grey) and {{0, −2}, {1, −1}, {2, 0}, {3, 1}, {4, 2}} (black). Simulation parameters are as per figure 5. (a) given by highest quality and lowest quality signallers employing the mean signaller strategy at each generation during a representative simulation run. For receivers, two curves indicate evolutionary change in the receiver error (ǭ) produced by receivers employing the mean receiver strategy for each channel at each generation during the same simulation run. A third curve (grey) indicates the proportion of receivers paying attention to channel 1. The dotted grey line atǭ = ǫ thresh = 0.3 indicates the threshold on receiver error that was used to distinguish the attainment of honest signalling from failure to do so. Simulation parameters are as per figure 5 plus m = 0.05. : Both panels depict results from the same simulation runs sampling 17×17 evenly distributed points in the C 1 × C 2 parameter space (B = 0 in all cases). Each data point represents an average over 25 simulations runs. Upper panel : the frequency with which honest signalling equilibria are discovered on channel 1 (grey isoclines) and channel 2 (heavy isoclines). Lower panel : the signed difference between the mean signal range on each channel at honest signalling equilibrium,ρ 1 −ρ 2 . Isoclines are labeled to indicate scenarios for whichρ 1 ≫ρ 2 ,ρ 1 =ρ 2 , andρ 1 ≪ρ 2 . (This measure is undefined for the upper right quadrant since no honest signalling equilibria were achieved in this region of parameter space). Parameters as figure 8. Figure 10: The data from the lower left quadrant of figure 9 (i.e., where both B > C 1 and B > C 2 ) are aggregated and replotted against C 1 − C 2 . The solid curve represents the signed difference between the proportion of simulation runs that achieve honest signalling equilibrium on channel 1 and the proportion that achieved honesty on channel 2. The dashed curve representsρ 1 −ρ 2 , being the signed difference between the average equilibrium signal range on channels 1 and 2 (std. devs. were small, varying being between 1% and 3% of the mean). 
